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Three recent legislative and regulatory proposals seek to enlist lawyers 
in thwarting crime.1  Outraged opponents have relied on flamboyant 
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 1. These proposals are in varying stages of existence. The American Bar 
Association (ABA) recently adopted an amendment to its model rule on confidentiality 
that would allow lawyers to disclose information “to prevent the client from committing 
a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using 
the lawyer’s services.” ABA Amends Ethics Rules on Confidentiality, Corporate Clients, 
to Allow More Disclosures, 19 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 467, 467 
(2003) [hereinafter ABA Amends Ethics Rules] (reporting the adoption of Model Rule 
1.6(b)(2)).  The ABA adopted a parallel provision allowing lawyers to disclose to 
“prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury” caused by the prohibited conduct in the 
past.  Id.  (reporting the adoption of Model Rule 1.6(b)(3)).  States have yet to respond to 
the new model rules, which are, in effect, proposals for state action. 
In 2002, Congress required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
promulgate some regulations governing securities lawyers.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (“[T]he Commission shall issue rules . . . 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and 
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rhetoric.2  They challenge the notion that lawyers should act as 
gatekeepers3—which some of the opponents deem equivalent to 
 
practicing before the Commission.”).  In response, the SEC adopted rules that require 
securities lawyers who become aware of “credible evidence” that a client is violating a 
federal or state securities law or is materially breaching a fiduciary duty arising under 
federal or state law to report the matter to the chief legal officer, the chief executive, or 
to a legal compliance committee, and ultimately to take further steps. 17 C.F.R. §§ 
205.1(b)(2), (e), 205.3(b) (2003) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule].  The SEC proposed, but 
held in abeyance pending further comment, a rule that would require attorneys who have 
gone up the ladder within a corporation and who still “believe that the reported material 
violation is ongoing or is about to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the 
financial interest of the issuer or of investors . . . to withdraw from the representation, 
notify the Commission of their withdrawal, and disaffirm any submission to the 
Commission that they have participated in preparing which is tainted by the violation.”  
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 FED. REG. 
71,674 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]; see Implementation of 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 FED. REG. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter Final Rule Discussion Section] (noting deferral of implementation and 
stating “[w]e are still considering the ‘noisy withdrawal’ provisions of our original 
proposal under section 307”).  See generally Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical 
Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004) (analyzing in 
comprehensive fashion the Sarbanes-Oxley controversy). 
The ABA’s most recent revisions to the Model Rules includes a revised Model Rule 
1.13, discussed infra notes 58 & 87, that parallels the adopted and proposed SEC 
regulations.  Revised Model Rule 1.13(c) is a permissive provision that would allow 
organizational lawyers who have gone up the ladder to disclose information, but only 
when disclosure is necessary to prevent “‘substantial injury’ to the organization.”  ABA 
Amends Ethics Rules, supra, at 468. 
Finally, an international task force is considering a range of proposals that would, in 
some form, enlist the help of lawyers in reporting client money laundering and other 
unlawful activity.  See authorities cited infra note 94.  American agencies have postponed 
their own consideration of regulations to the same effect pending the task force’s report. 
 2. See, e.g., Jonathan Peterson, SEC Wants Attorneys to Stand Up to Companies’ 
Misconduct, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at C1 (“Critics are using such terms as 
‘orwellian’ to describe the [Sarbanes-Oxley] proposal.”); Seth Stern, . . . And Attorneys 
Face New Rules on Secrets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 13, 2003, at 2 (quoting 
William Paul, former ABA President, as stating that the recently adopted ABA rules 
paralleling the Sarbanes-Oxley proposals are “bartering away a piece of our professional 
soul to gain some hoped-for public approval”); ABA Amends Ethics Rules, supra note 1, 
at 469 (quoting Lawrence Fox’s claim that proposed rules requiring a corporate lawyer 
to respond to client misconduct make the lawyer an “uberdirector”); id. (quoting Judah 
Best’s characterization of the proposed 1.13(c) as “utterly wicked”); ABA Update of 
Model Ethics Rules All But Completed in Philadelphia, 18 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL 
PROF’L CONDUCT 99, 101 (2002) (“Stephen A. Saltzburg . . . told the delegates that the 
‘gatekeeper initiative’ is the ‘single most alarming threat to the attorney-client privilege 
to be seen in a long time.’”); cf. W. Bradley Wendel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love Lawyer-Bashing: Some Post-Conference Reflections, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1027, 
1044 (2003) (“Debevoise & Plimpton worried that ‘the [SEC] would be using the 
attorney as the Commission’s eyes and ears to build a case against the client.’”). 
 3. Howard Stock, S-O’s Lawyer Rule May Chill Information Flow, INVESTOR 
REL. BUS., Aug. 18, 2003 (quoting Professor Jill Fisch to the effect that “[t]here are 
plenty of watchdogs already in place, and lawyers are poorly positioned to be 
gatekeepers”); David E. Rovella, Going from Bad to Worse: Defense Bar Fears Jail over 
Tainted Fees, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A1 (quoting practitioners who argue that 
efforts “to make lawyers ‘gatekeepers’ of the financial system may further impede the 
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operating like the “secret police in Eastern European countries.”4 
This article makes a simple, and ultimately uncontroversial, point.5  
Lawyers are gatekeepers and always have been.  Whatever one’s 
position on the merits of the specific reforms currently being proposed, it 
is important to avoid the misconception that lawyers have no role to play 
in preventing client misconduct. 
At its root, the gatekeeper rhetoric conflates several separate concepts.  
At one level, everyone will agree that lawyers are clients’ agents and 
that lawyers’ traditional role in the adversary system is to help clients 
pursue lawful goals through those lawful means that are available.  That, 
however, is quite different from saying that lawyers should do whatever 
clients want, that lawyers should assist clients in achieving illegal 
pursuits, or that lawyers have no business shaping client ends. 
Let us consider, as a starting point, the famous statement of Elihu 
Root that “half of the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling 
 
ability of criminal defense lawyers to properly represent their clients”); cf. Corporate 
Counsel Critique SEC Proposal On Lawyer Reporting Mandated by New Law, 18 
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 698, 698 (2002) (reporting the criticism 
that, in close cases, the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations put attorneys “in the role of judge 
rather than advocate”). 
 4. Programs Explore Concern that Government is ‘Federalizing’ Professional 
Ethics Rules, 19 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 320, 322 (2003) 
[hereinafter Programs Explore Concern] (quoting comment regarding the proposed 
gatekeeper initiative “Doesn’t that conjure up a sort of East German notion of reporting 
all ‘suspicious’ behavior?”); see also Bruce Moyer, The Dawn of Federal Regulation of 
Attorney Conduct?, 50 FED. LAW. 5, 5 (2003) (“Corporate law firms and bar associations 
had levied a barrage of criticism at the SEC’s proposed ‘noisy withdrawal’ rule, saying it 
threatened to turn lawyers into a police force.”); Wendel, supra note 2, at 1044 
(“Sullivan and Cromwell resists the [SEC’s alleged] requirement that lawyers ‘police 
and pass judgment on their clients.’”); ABA Amends Ethics Rules, supra note 1, at 467 
(“[William Paul] charged that the [proposed Model Rule] changes threaten to turn 
lawyers into ‘policemen, prosecutors, judges, and regulators.’”); cf. John C. Elam, 
Lawyers Shouldn’t Be Police Agents: ABA Must Preserve Client Confidentiality, NAT’L 
L.J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 37 (“[A]n attorney should . . . not be cast in the role of policeman 
or watchman over his client.”). 
 5. Indeed, the point may be so uncontroversial that some readers will perceive the 
article as erecting and knocking down a strawman.  The notion that lawyers sometimes 
must intervene in client misconduct, particularly in transactional representation, hardly 
requires support.  See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene B. Gaetke, The 
Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 
9, 14 (2004) (proposing steps “to invigorate the transactional lawyer’s role as gatekeeper 
further”).  Nevertheless, misuse of the term “gatekeeper” and the heated rhetoric 
surrounding the recent reform proposals have tended to muddy the waters.  These 
developments justify reiteration and clarification of lawyers’ traditional gatekeeping role. 
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would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop.”6  We 
should remember that Root, among his other accomplishments, was a 
high-powered attorney noted for representing notorious corporate and 
political clients.7  One biographer has characterized Root’s practice as 
“tempered by a failure to regard the law as a living organism and by a 
reluctance to look beyond its letter to its implications for society as a 
whole.”8  In one famous case, Root and his co-counsel were nearly held 
in contempt for representing a corrupt politician and were lectured by 
the presiding judge as follows: 
I ask you young gentlemen, to remember that good faith to a client never can 
justify or require bad faith to your own consciences, and that however good a 
thing it may be, to be known as successful and great lawyers, it is even a better 
thing, to be known as honest men.9 
Root, to his death, protested the importance of aggressive advocacy.  
In a speech to graduates of Columbia Law School, he stated: “One 
obligation I want to impress upon you. . . .  You must support the law even 
when in particular cases its justice seems doubtful.  The inviolability of 
constitutional and statutory rights is more valuable than the punishment 
of any one criminal.”10  Given this commitment to partisanship, what did 
Root mean when emphasizing the duty to stand in the way of client 
conduct and how did he anticipate that lawyers should accomplish the 
half of their practice that consists of telling their clients “no”? 
There are four broad aspects of lawyers’ traditional role that 
necessarily involve lawyers in regulating client conduct.  Each will be 
discussed below.  Categorized broadly, the lawyer functions that might 
require a lawyer to seek to prevent client behavior include: (1) advising 
clients, (2) screening cases and legal arguments, (3) avoiding personal 
participation in improper behavior, and (4) disclosing confidences, when 
permitted by rule, to serve interests that trump the client’s. 
I.  THE ADVISING FUNCTION 
Lawyers’ alliance with clients and lawyers’ duty to serve client 
interests do not require lawyers either to agree with client aims11 or to 
 
 6. 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938). 
 7. See RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, ELIHU ROOT AND THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION 
12, 14–18 (Oscar Handlin ed., 1954) (discussing Root’s participation in defending Boss 
Tweed and noting that this “did brand Root for all time as the defender of a corrupt boss 
and persuaded many persons that he would accept anyone as a client”). 
 8. Id. at 19. 
 9. 1 JESSUP, supra note 6, at 88. 
 10. Id. at 93. 
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES] (“A lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of 
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assume that clients always wish to maximize their own economic 
interests.12  Thomas Shaffer13 and others14 have written that lawyers have 
both a right and an obligation to engage in a moral dialogue with their 
clients.15  At a minimum, lawyers owe clients information, including 
information that suggests that the clients’ proposed or completed conduct 
is criminal (or wrongful in other respects).16  Especially when a client 
may initially be uninformed, lawyers owe it to the client to identify and 
explain all the ramifications of particular behavior, including the moral 
consequences for the client and the effects of the behavior on third 
persons who may subsequently blame the client.17  Many professional 
codes make the duty to keep clients informed explicit.18  Presumably, the 
option of acting ethically is one that a client might wish to consider.19 
 
the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.”).  Citations 
throughout this Article are to the new version of the Model Rules adopted in 2002.  
References to provisions that were subsequently amended are specifically identified. 
 12. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1341 (1995) (questioning the practice of lawyers who 
“assume that their sole mission is to maximize the clients’ chances of obtaining their 
desired results”); see also Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional 
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 503, 504–05, 538 (1985) (finding that lawyers in large law firms enthusiastically 
seek the maximization of client interests without attempting to discuss the goals first); 
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 30 (discussing the framework from which lawyers 
approach client counseling). 
 13. E.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 319, 328 (1987); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 231 (1979). 
 14. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A 
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 630–32 (discussing 
the importance of moral discourse for lawyers who emphasize client autonomy in 
decisionmaking); Zacharias, supra note 12, at 1357–62 (discussing the possibility of 
codifying a duty to engage in a moral discourse with clients). 
 15. Even Monroe Freedman, the strongest proponent of partisan lawyering, 
acknowledges the importance of discussing objectives with clients.  See Monroe H. 
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 
200 (1977) (warning lawyers against “assum[ing] the worst regarding the client’s 
desires”); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1478 (1966) (arguing 
that lawyers have a duty to remonstrate with clients who wish to commit perjury). 
 16. The client must know this information at least in order to make informed 
judgments regarding whether pursuing the objective is worth the potential consequences. 
 17. A lawyer who fails to do so ultimately may subject the client to reactions that 
disadvantage the client and that the client did not anticipate. 
 18. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.4 (requiring communication with 
clients). 
 19. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr. et al., Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral 
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The spirit of the codes goes further, however—encouraging lawyers to 
express their own moral positions20 and to attempt to persuade clients to 
act well.21  One of the traditional justifications for strict attorney-client 
confidentiality and privilege is that the guarantee of secrecy enhances a 
lawyer’s ability to learn what the client plans to do and facilitates the 
lawyer’s task of encouraging law compliance.22  Other aspects of the 
codes emphasize the importance of lawyers maintaining independent 
judgment23 and avoiding giving any assistance to illegal and fraudulent 
client conduct.24  The essence of these provisions is that lawyers should 
not act simply as clients’ alter egos.  Lawyer independence can help 
serve client interests, but it comes freighted with personal moral 
responsibility that lawyers must exercise within the confines of the rules 
governing confidentiality and loyalty.25 
One recent case suggests that a lawyer’s responsibility to counteract 
client misconduct has legal ramifications as well.  Traditionally, the 
crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege has been interpreted to 
mean that client communications are unprivileged when uttered for the 
purpose of involving, or using, the attorney in committing a crime or 
fraud.26  In In re Public Defender Service, the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals held that the crime-fraud exception applies only when a 
lawyer has been unsuccessful in dissuading the client from committing 
the intended misconduct.27  In other words, by exercising the 
 
Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 608 (2003) (“Survey evidence suggests that lawyers 
significantly underestimate the extent to which clients would welcome non-legal advice.”). 
 20. Many jurisdictions follow MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.7(a)(2), which 
requires a lawyer to obtain a conflict waiver when her representation might be limited 
“by a personal interest of the lawyer,” including her moral interests. 
 21. For example, MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 2.1 provides: “In representing a 
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid 
advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant 
to the client’s situation.” 
 22. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (justifying 
attorney-client privilege by reference to the need to facilitate lawyers’ ability to promote 
law compliance by clients). 
 23. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 2.1. 
 24. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.2(d) & cmt. 
 25. Cf. Cochran, Jr. et al., supra note 19, at 608 (“As officers of the court and 
gatekeepers in imperfect regulatory processes, lawyers have obligations that transcend 
those owed to any particular client. . . .  [N]either legal nor market systems can function 
effectively if lawyers lack a basic sense of social responsibility for the consequences of 
their professional acts.”). 
 26. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1995) (“There is no privilege . . . if the 
services of the lawyer were . . . obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to 
commit a crime or a fraud.”). 
 27. 831 A.2d. 890, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[A]n ill-motivated client communication 
that ‘goes nowhere’—as where the client consults an attorney with an evil purpose but the 
attorney quashes the venture . . . —is not sufficiently in furtherance of a crime or fraud to 
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gatekeeping function of dissuasion, the lawyer can retroactively convert 
potentially damaging discoverable statements into privileged 
communications.  Consider the ramifications of the court’s conception: 
if the court’s analysis is correct, lawyers in these circumstances arguably 
have a professional obligation to dissuade, rooted in competency 
requirements, because that is the only way to maintain the client’s legal 
rights.28 
To be clear, let me neither understate nor overstate my position.  There is 
a hard question; namely, the extent to which lawyers should investigate 
clients’ motives and conduct in an effort to uncover illegality that they 
should counteract.  Robert Gordon recently has written a forceful argument 
that lawyers’ conscious efforts to avoid learning the true facts are what 
made lawyers complicit in the Enron scandal.29  The effect that an 
investigative role might have on the lawyer-client relationship underlies the 
legitimate controversy surrounding the Gatekeeper Initiative, which may 
ultimately require lawyers to investigate or report suspicious client 
activity.30  I focus here, however, on the simpler question of whether 
lawyers have any gatekeeper role to play. 
The lawyer’s role, and all of the lawyer’s professional obligations, 
should be read against the backdrop of agency law.  As clients’ 
employees and agents, lawyers have significant responsibility to serve 
their masters.31  Yet agency law also sets boundaries, recognizing 
limitations concerning what agents must do for their masters and 
authorizing agents to react to superior third party interests.32  The lawyer 
codes fine tune agency law for the special functions lawyers serve, but 
 
fall within the crime-fraud exception.”).   
 28. Cf. id. at 901 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege encourages clients to make . . . 
unguarded and ill-advised suggestions to their lawyers. The lawyer is then obliged, in the 
interests of justice and the client’s own long-term best interests, to urge the client . . . to 
abandon illegal conduct or plans.”) (emphasis added). 
 29. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After 
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1199–200 (2003); cf. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 17, 103–05 (1985) 
(discussing the conscious practice of criminal defense lawyers of avoiding learning the 
actual facts). 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2001) (“[A]n agent must act in the principal’s interest as well as on the principal’s 
behalf.”). 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958) (“An agent is 
privileged to reveal information confidentially acquired by him in the course of his 
agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself or of a third person.”). 
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the codes do not change the underlying axiom: principals are not entitled 
to the help of their agents in committing wrongs, and agents’ personal 
moral responsibility is not extinguished by virtue of their agency status. 
II.  THE SCREENING FUNCTION 
Lawyers serve most clearly as gatekeepers in screening the legal 
claims clients make.33  There are various aspects to the screening 
function, all of which have been recognized explicitly in the professional 
codes or other law. 
Lawyers must, for example, screen the filings clients make before 
courts34 and administrative agencies.35 If they do not, the lawyers 
themselves are subject to sanction.  Sanctions can take the form of 
personal civil liability,36 discipline,37 or fines.38 
 
 33. Lawyers, of course, screen client claims for a variety of reasons, some of 
which rest on economic self-interest and some of which rest on their obligation to 
exercise independent judgment.  Cf. Teresa Stanton Collett, The Common Good and the 
Duty to Represent: Must the Last Lawyer in Town Take Any Case?, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 
137, 171–72 (1999) (arguing that a lawyer may reject a case for moral and political 
reasons even if he is the “last lawyer in town”); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee 
Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 26, 29 (1997) 
(“[C]ontingency fee lawyers generally turn down at least as many cases as they 
accept, . . . most often because those potential clients do not have a basis for the case.”). 
 34. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court . . . a pleading, 
written motion, or other paper, an attorney . . . is certifying that . . . (1) it is not being 
presented for any improper purpose, . . . (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions therein are warranted by existing law . . . (3) the allegations and other factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or . . . are likely to have evidentiary support . . . and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or . . . are reasonably 
based on a lack of information or belief.”); see also Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of 
Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2003) (“Even a litigator is 
a gatekeeper who typically makes a representation of due inquiry and colorable merit 
when he or she signs a pleading.”). 
 35. Some of the federal regulations requiring lawyers to screen positions taken 
before agencies are collected and discussed in Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent 
Trends in Federal Regulation of Lawyers, 2003 SYMP. ISSUE PROF’L LAWYER 
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). 
 36. The SEC has always treated attorneys who participate in the preparation of 
documents that violate federal securities laws as aiders and abettors.  E.g., SEC v. Nat’l 
Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 715 (D. D.C. 1978); cf. Cent. Bank v. First 
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding attorneys civilly liable under Rule 
10b-5 when they are “primary” violators of the rule).  In the notorious Kaye, Scholer 
case, the Office of Thrift Supervision imposed financial liability upon attorneys, 
establishing its position that lawyers who file documents as agents for clients assume the 
clients’ reporting obligations.  See Zacharias, supra note 35.  Other federal agencies have 
followed suit.  See id. 
 37. See, e.g., In re Scott, 4 CAL. ST. B. CT. RPTR. 446 (2002) (suspending attorney 
for filing a frivolous lawsuit); cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 3.1 (forbidding 
lawyers from asserting frivolous positions). 
 38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (authorizing monetary penalties for violations 
of Rule 11). 
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Post-filing, tribunals continue to rely upon lawyers to screen client 
arguments, perceiving that to be an essential aspect of efficient judicial 
administration.  At the simplest level, lawyers may not take frivolous 
positions.39  But the dependence on lawyers as gatekeepers goes further.  
Rules like Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate that 
lawyers should also prevent clients from filing nonfrivolous claims for 
an improper purpose.40  Courts expect lawyers to cull the arguments clients 
wish them to pursue, in deference to the need for judicial efficiency in 
responding to the arguments.41  And the professional codes impose 
candor to tribunal regulations that sometimes require lawyers to disclose 
information that clients want to keep secret.42  In some instances, the 
lawyer must turn on the client directly in order to preserve interests that 
society has deemed more important than the client’s interests.43 
III.  THE PERSONAL SEPARATION FUNCTION 
There are both broad and narrow legal principles that impose on lawyers 
the obligation to separate themselves from unlawful or fraudulent client 
activity.  In doing so, lawyers influence client conduct.  The lawyer’s refusal 
to take a particular action on a client’s behalf, such as filing a fraudulent 
claim, can effectively prevent the client from succeeding in the action.  The 
lawyer’s threat of withdrawal, or actual withdrawal, may be enough to 
prevent the client from pursuing his plan.44  In some instances, the lawyer’s 
ability to disavow actions that she45 has taken or documents that she has 
prepared is tantamount to allowing the lawyer to disclose a client’s 
wrongdoing. 
The professional codes do not mince words.  Lawyers may not engage 
in dishonest behavior.46  More specifically, they may not participate in or 
 
 39. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 3.1. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (prohibiting filing court documents “presented for any 
improper purpose”). 
 41. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 746 (1983) (noting the importance of 
allowing lawyers to “winnow” the arguments made to the court, even when the client disagrees). 
 42. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 3.3(a). 
 43. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 3.3(b). 
 44. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 53 (1986) (considering whether liability 
should be imposed on lawyers for failing to “disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers”). 
 45. To avoid confusion, this essay refers to lawyers as female and to other actors 
in the system as male. 
 46. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 8.4(c) (forbidding “conduct involving dishonesty”). 
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assist illegal conduct47—and the ABA has interpreted the term “assist” 
very broadly.48  To the extent the client insists upon a lawyer’s 
participation in forbidden conduct, the lawyer must withdraw.49  After 
withdrawing, she may also disavow documents that reflect her unwitting 
complicity in improper actions.50 
The professional codes are only the tip of the iceberg.  Criminal laws 
apply to lawyers as well.51  Lawyers may not conspire with clients,52 aid 
or abet illegal conduct,53 or participate directly in client crimes or 
frauds.54  Moreover, fees they receive that are a product of illegal 
conduct may be subject to seizure.55  Again, therefore, lawyers are 
required to make themselves aware of the nature of client conduct56 and, 
by their reactions, play a significant role in shaping subsequent client 
behavior. 
 
 47. Id. R. 1.2(d). 
 48. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) 
(interpreting the term “assisting” broadly to include more than “criminal law concepts of 
aiding and abetting or subornation”); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 (1993) (reaffirming Formal Op. 87-353’s broad 
interpretation of “assisting”). 
 49. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.16(a)(1). 
 50. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 
 51. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 327, 330–52 (1998) (discussing the interaction of criminal law and professional 
regulation); Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 
73, 79–91 (2001) (analyzing the notion that lawyers’ professional activities are “beyond 
the law”); Zacharias, supra note 35 (noting that lawyers have always been subject to 
criminal prosecution for criminal acts related to their practice). 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a 
lawyer’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud the government); United States v. Enstam, 
622 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud 
the government by impairing the collection of taxes). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding a 
conviction for aiding and abetting mail fraud); United States v. Arrington, 719 F.2d 701 
(4th Cir. 1983) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for aiding and abetting a conspiracy to 
receive and sell stolen property). 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Feaster, No. 87-1340, 1988 WL 33814 (6th Cir. Apr. 
15, 1988) (unpublished opinion) (upholding a conviction of a lawyer for participating in 
the preparation of false tax returns); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 
1987) (upholding a lawyer’s conviction for obstruction of justice). 
 55. See, e.g., Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), (c) (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986) (providing, inter alia, for the forfeiture to the U.S. of property derived 
from particular crimes and rendering transfers of such property to attorneys subject to 
seizure by the government); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 
617, 623–35 (1989) (holding that the forfeiture of fees paid to an attorney was consistent 
with §853 of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1982 and was constitutional). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 604 (1989) (rejecting the 
argument that attorneys who do not know a client’s property is subject to forfeiture 
should be allowed to retain fees paid with forfeitable assets); United States v. Raimondo, 
721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that an attorney should have known that his 
client’s property and profits might be subject to forfeiture by virtue of the client’s 
indictment). 
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IV.  THE DIRECT GATEKEEPER FUNCTION 
In certain situations, the professional codes already impose upon 
lawyers the precise type of gatekeeper function that has proven so 
controversial in the recent reform proposals.  Corporate and other 
organizational lawyers, for example, are required to “take remedial 
measures” upon learning of corporate illegality and certain other kinds 
of wrongdoing.57  In most jurisdictions, the implementation of this 
obligation is subject to significant discretion on the part of the lawyer.58  
Unlike under some of the recent proposals,59 a lawyer typically may not 
disclose corporate wrongdoing to authorities outside the organization.60  
But the implication nonetheless is clear: the lawyer does play a 
significant role in preventing client misconduct.61 
More importantly, the general issue of whether a lawyer should have a 
direct gatekeeper role in preventing client misconduct is a red herring.  
The attorney-client privilege has always excluded client communications 
made for the purpose of involving a lawyer in a criminal or fraudulent 
enterprise.62  All American jurisdictions recognize that society’s need to 
prevent particular kinds of client conduct sometimes trumps the client’s 
interests in confidentiality and his lawyer’s loyalty.63  All lawyer codes 
 
 57. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13(b). 
 58. Under rules like Model Rule 1.13(b), lawyers are given a menu of possible 
actions that they can take.  Some jurisdictions expand the menu, or make certain actions 
mandatory.  See, e.g., MD. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.13(c) (2004) (allowing some 
disclosures of otherwise confidential information); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 
1.13(c) (2004) (allowing some disclosures); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 
1.13(c) (2004) (allowing disclosure of criminal conduct); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, R. 1.13(c) (2004) (providing that remedial action may, under some 
circumstances, include disclosure of confidential information). 
 59. E.g., Proposed Rule, supra note 1. 
 60. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13 cmt.; CAL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, R. 3-600(B)(2) (2003). As stated in note 58 supra, a few jurisdictions do 
allow disclosure. 
 61. See generally Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 5 (discussing the gatekeeping 
role of transactional lawyers). 
 62. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000) (identifying 
the crime-fraud exception to attorney client privilege). 
 63. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7.3 at 301 (1986) 
(“[T]he normal expectation of lawyer loyalty to a client’s interests is hardly an absolute.  
It does not purport to be a reason why a lawyer must always maintain silence regardless 
of the claims and interests of third persons.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client 
Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 211 (2001) (discussing 
“‘social compact rules,’ under which third party or societal interests simply trump client 
autonomy”). 
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have confidentiality exceptions64—some discretionary,65 some mandatory.66  
In either event, the differences among the code provisions are only a 
matter of degree.  They do not vary on the question of whether a lawyer 
may ever disclose client misconduct, but simply distinguish among the 
situations in which disclosure is appropriate. 
V.  THE RECENT CRITICISMS AND THE MODERN REFORMS 
The observations above illustrate that the modern critics are wrong in 
the rhetoric they have selected.  Requiring lawyers to respond to client 
misconduct is not automatically equivalent to enlisting lawyers as secret 
police.67  Indeed, the lawyer’s role has always included a substantial 
gatekeeper aspect.68 
Older conceptions of professionalism probably envisioned greater 
involvement by lawyers in preventing client wrongdoing69 than the 
 
 64. Until recently, California’s confidentiality provision seemed to be absolute.  
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003); see San Diego County Bar Ass’n Legal 
Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1990-1, at 3 (1990) available at 
http://www.sdcba.org/ethics/ethicsopinion90-1.html (interpreting § 6068(e) as being 
absolute).  See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367 (1994) (analyzing the status of confidentiality and privilege in 
California). The provision was recently amended, however, to include a future crime 
exception roughly similar to the one in the pre-2003 Model Rules.  See A.B. 1101, 2003–
04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (amending § 6068(e) of California’s Business and 
Professions Code to allow an attorney to “reveal confidential information to the extent 
that the attorney reasonably believes disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act 
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm to an individual”) (effective July 1, 
2004). 
 65. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.6(b) (allowing certain disclosures); 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(C)(3) (1969) (allowing disclosure of 
client’s intent to commit a future crime or fraud) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
 66. E.g., FLA. RULES OF COURT, R. 4-1.6(b) (2003) (requiring the disclosure of 
information necessary to prevent a crime or serious bodily harm); ILL. COURT RULES & 
PROC., R. 1.6(b) (2003) (requiring disclosure to prevent certain harms); N.J. RULES OF 
COURT, R. 1.6(b) (2004) (requiring disclosure to prevent certain criminal and fraudulent 
acts). 
 67. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 68. For an interesting discussion of the constraints upon lawyers in exercising their 
gatekeeper role with respect to “strategic litigation” by clients, see generally Ronald J. 
Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. 
REV. 869, 885 (1990). 
 69. See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History 
of the 1908 Canons, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 10–12 (1999) (characterizing David 
Hoffman’s 1836 “Resolutions for Professional Deportment” as being based, in part, on 
the notion that a lawyer should act as a “gatekeeper”); Gordon, supra note 29, at 1208–
09 (citing the 1908 ABA Canons for the proposition that a lawyer must “observe and 
advise his client[s] to [follow] the . . . law” and discussing conceptions of the corporate 
lawyer as a “wise-counselor-lawyer-statesman” that endured until the 1970s); Russell G. 
Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241–42 (1992) (suggesting the limitations on partisanship in early 
American professional norms). 
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partisan conceptions that developed in the 1970s.70  But even the latter, 
and their developed forms that are encapsulated in modern professional 
codes, had lawyer gatekeeping in mind.  The modern tradition of ultra-
partisan criminal defense lawyering may encourage lawyers to think of 
their relationship with clients primarily in terms of an alliance.  Yet, 
upon reflection, even the most active partisan advocates should be 
willing to concede that the alliance has limits.71 
Which brings us to the real, important question—one from which the 
modern rhetoric deflects attention.  Assuming that lawyers sometimes 
have some role to play in shaping or responding to illegal or improper 
conduct, what is that role?  More specifically, where on the spectrum of 
potential lawyer gatekeeping do the recently proposed reforms fall?  Do 
they, in fact, require anything new or anything that is inconsistent with 
the essential attorney-client relationship that society should wish to 
protect? 
To the extent criticism of the proposals is fair, it must fall in one of 
two categories.  First, it may be that one or the other proposal simply 
goes too far in emphasizing the gatekeeping role.  In other words, the 
proposals may weigh societal interests in disclosure or preventing client 
misconduct too heavily, or may shortchange the societal benefits 
achieved by safeguarding partisanship.  The second possible criticism is 
related to the first.  The proposals may undermine essential aspects of 
the lawyer-client relationship in a way that unduly interferes with the 
lawyer’s ability to fulfill the functions that the adversarial system 
depends upon her to undertake and accomplish. 
Consider, for example, the change to Model Rule 1.6 recently adopted 
by the ABA, based on a recommendation by the ABA Corporate 
Responsibility Task Force.72  The new rule effectuates one significant 
 
 70. See Zacharias, supra note 12, at 1314–27 (discussing the evolution of 
partisanship in lawyering and the changing emphases on objectivity during different 
periods of American history) and authorities cited at 1319–20 nn.54–57. 
 71. See supra note 15; see also Davis, supra note 34, at 1283 (opposing recent 
reform proposals, but conceding that lawyers sometimes act as gatekeepers); Lessons 
from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. REV. 683, 719 
(2003) (“Now, Sol said a couple of things that reminded me that lawyers are not only 
gatekeepers; lawyers are watchdogs. We fill both roles.”) (comments of former ABA 
President A. P. Carlton). 
 72. See ABA Amends Ethics Rules, supra note 1 (reporting the amendments); see 
also ABA Task Force Revised Recommendations on Model Rule Changes Generally 
Welcomed, 19 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 263 (2003) (reporting the 
ABA Task Force proposals to amend the model rules). 
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change.  It would permit lawyers whose services are being, or have been, 
used to perpetuate a financial crime or fraud upon a third person to 
disclose the fraud to the extent necessary to prevent or rectify the 
injury.73  Is this a revolutionary change?  Does it, as one opponent has 
asserted, “turn lawyers into the new cops on the beat, auditors of their 
clients, whistleblowers for the government . . . [and] destroy the very 
core values that preserve the lawyer-client relationship”?74 
Hardly.  The ABA’s 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
which used to apply in most states, allowed disclosure for ongoing or 
future financial crimes.75  The comments to the 1983 Model Rules 
already allow lawyers to “disavow” documents in circumstances similar 
to those contemplated by the new rule.76  The current change was only 
narrowly defeated both when the 1983 rules were initially proposed77 
and again two years ago, when a similar amendment was proposed to the 
ABA House of Delegates.78 
Moreover, the change is narrow.  It is discretionary.  It does not allow 
lawyers to blow the whistle on client frauds or crimes unless the 
lawyers’ services are being or have been used, essentially, to make the 
lawyers co-conspirators.  The permitted disclosures are limited to those 
necessary to prevent the injury.  They parallel disclosures permitted 
under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege,79 so 
clients have no right to perceive the information to be sacrosanct.  In 
short, in most situations, the attorney-client relationship continues as 
usual.  The client simply must be forewarned that there are limits to what 
 
 73. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.6(b)(2) (2003 version) (permitting lawyers 
to disclose “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and 
in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services”); see also 
MODEL RULES, supra, R. 1.6(b)(3) (2003 version) (permitting lawyers to disclose “to 
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission 
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services”). 
 74. Lawrence J. Fox, On the Proposed Changes in ABA Model Rules: Frontal 
Assaults on the Profession, 229 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 7 (Aug. 6, 2003). 
 75. MODEL CODE, supra note 65, DR 4-101(C)(3) (allowing lawyers to disclose a 
client’s intention to commit any crime). 
 76. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.6 cmt. 
 77. See Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice For Securities Lawyers in the Post-
Enron Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and 
Market Gatekeeper, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 91, 141–44 (2002) (noting that, in February 
1983, “the ABA House of Delegates voted to eliminate from Model Rule 1.6 the two 
provisions relating to the prevention and rectification of client fraud, by a vote of 207 to 
129”). 
 78. ABA Stands Firm On Client Confidentiality, Rejects ‘Screening’ For Conflicts 
of Interest, 17 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 492 (2001) (reporting the 
rejection of proposed revisions to the Model Rules). 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
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he can expect the lawyer to do for, or with, him. 
Consider next the recently adopted Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, which 
have been echoed, in part, in a new version of Model Rule 1.13 just 
adopted by the ABA.80  In essence, the SEC regulations require 
corporate lawyers81 who are aware of particular types of prospective 
corporate misconduct82 to report the issues to the organization’s “chief 
legal officer . . . or to both the [organization’s] chief legal officer and its 
chief executive officer”83 or to a “qualified legal compliance 
committee.”84  Lawyers who do not receive an “appropriate response”—
one that avoids the misconduct or convinces the lawyer that her 
assessment was erroneous—must refrain from participating in the 
misconduct and continue to report up the ladder.  In some cases, they 
also may disclose information to the SEC.85 
 
 80. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13(b), (c) (2003 version) (requiring lawyers 
who know that a corporate officer is engaging in a violation of law that is likely to 
substantially injure the organization to take remedial steps and permitting the lawyers to 
disclose outside the organization under certain circumstances). 
 81. The proposed rule’s definition of the term “attorney” seemed to broadly 
encompass nonsecurities lawyers who simply prepare or review limited portions of a 
filing, lawyers who respond to auditors’ letters or prepare work product unrelated to 
securities matters that may later be used in connection with filings, and lawyers 
preparing documents that eventually may be filed as exhibits.  Proposed Rule, supra note 
1, at 71,676, 71,678.  The final rule provides that, to be covered, an attorney must at least 
have notice that his work will be submitted to the Commission.  Final Rule Discussion 
Section, supra note 1, General Overview, at 6298 (“[A]n attorney must have notice that a 
document he or she is preparing or assisting in preparing will be submitted to the 
Commission to be deemed to be ‘appearing and practicing’ under the revised definition.”). 
 82. The covered misconduct is not limited to violations of federal securities laws.  
The regulations address broader breaches of fiduciary duties, particularly breaches of 
duties to pension funds.  SEC Final Rule, supra note 1, § 205.2(d). 
 83. Id. § 205.3(b). 
 84. Id. § 205.3(b), (c). 
 85. The SEC’s rule provides: 
   An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the 
representation of an issuer may reveal to the Commission, without the issuer’s 
consent, confidential information related to the representation to the extent the 
attorney reasonably believes necessary:  
 (i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely 
to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or 
investors;  
 (ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative 
proceeding from committing perjury . . . ; suborning perjury . . . ; or committing any 
act proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the 
Commission; or  
 (iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that 
caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of 
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These gatekeeping requirements are extensions of rules that already 
exist.  They require specific remedial action by lawyers,86 whereas most 
state codes only require some action and leave the specific response to 
lawyer discretion.87  They make the duty not to participate in 
wrongdoing explicit, but that duty already exists under the professional 
codes.88  To the extent that the gatekeeping requirements represent 
statements by the federal agency that lawyers are personally responsible 
for statements they make in filings before the agency, that also is 
nothing new at all.89  The most that critics can fairly argue about these 
new rules is that their extensions of existing requirements go too far and 
are bad public policy. 
That is different than what might be argued, for example, with respect 
to the provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations that the SEC has held 
in abeyance, pending further comment.90  This provision would require 
lawyers “who reasonably believe that the reported material violation is 
ongoing or is about to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to 
the financial interest of the issuer or of investors . . . [to] notify the 
Commission of their withdrawal, and disaffirm any submission to the 
Commission that they have participated in preparing which is tainted by 
the violation.”91  The ABA recently has adopted a revision to Model 
 
the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney’s services were 
used. 
Id. § 205.3(d)(2).  For an interesting recent discussion of the likely effects of the SEC 
regulations, see generally Jill E. Fisch and Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for 
Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003). 
 86. SEC Final Rules, supra note 1, § 205.3(b)(1), (3), (9) (imposing mandatory 
internal reporting requirements on attorneys with knowledge of a potential violation); Id. 
§ 205.3(d) (authorizing some disclosures to the SEC). 
 87. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13 (requiring the lawyer to 
“proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization” and 
providing examples of possible remedial measures).  Of course, the recent amendments 
to Model Rule 1.13 making certain actions mandatory are likely to influence some states 
to adopt a similar change for their own professional codes. 
 88. E.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.2(d), R. 1.16(a). 
 89. See Programs Explore Concern, supra note 4, at 320 (“Although Sarbanes-
Oxley certainly presents new nuances and challenges, [Bryan J. Redding] said, it is for 
all intents and purposes ‘just another aiding and abetting problem.’”); Zacharias, supra 
note 35 (discussing various federal regulations imposing personal responsibility on 
lawyers for their federal filings); cf. Davis, supra note 34, at 1283 (“As for the idea of 
the securities lawyer as gatekeeper, the general concept is noncontroversial since, under 
typical contractual arrangements, securities issuances cannot go forward without a host 
of opinions from the attorneys involved.”). 
 90. Although the SEC envisioned a relatively short comment period, the resulting 
controversy has led to a prolonged deferral and reconsideration of the proposal.  See 
Federal Lawmakers Get Earful at Hearing On SEC’s Proposed ‘Noisy Withdrawal’ 
Rules, 20 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 69 (2004) (discussing a 
congressional hearing regarding the proposed regulation). 
 91. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, deferred by SEC Final Rule Discussion Section, 
supra note 1.  In-house attorneys would not be required to withdraw, but would have to 
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Rule 1.13 that puts a somewhat similar, but permissive, requirement into 
effect.92 
These reforms are more than a matter of degree.  The SEC proposal, in 
particular, potentially changes the lawyer-client relationship because the 
lawyer is almost required to blackmail the client into law compliance; if 
the client does not abide by the lawyer’s view of correct behavior, the 
lawyer effectively must notify the SEC of the dispute, subjecting the 
client to investigation and likely sanction.  Although this type of blackmail 
is possible under the traditional (and new) exceptions to attorney-client 
confidentiality, those exceptions cover far more limited and extreme 
circumstances.  And because the traditional exceptions typically are 
discretionary, like the existing SEC disclosure rule,93 they do not 
envision the lawyer adopting the dominant role as routinely as the 
proposal would.  Nevertheless, the fair criticism of this proposal, again, 
is not that it is unique in requiring gatekeeping conduct, but rather that 
its effect would unduly interfere with the lawyer’s traditional role as 
confidant and advisor. 
Perhaps the most interesting of the recent reform proposals is the so-
called Gatekeeper Initiative.94  It is fair to say that the impetus for the 
initiative is to change lawyers from client allies to sources of 
information for government agents investigating terrorism and money 
laundering.  Accordingly, an ABA task force has already gone on record 
as opposing any proposal that would require the disclosure of 
confidential information “or otherwise compromise the lawyer-client 
relationship or the independence of the bar.”95 
 
“disaffirm any tainted submission they have participated in preparing.”  Id. 
 92. See ABA Amends Ethics Rules, supra note 1, at 468 (reporting the adoption of 
a provision stating that an organizational lawyer who has not received an appropriate 
response to an up-the-ladder report “may reveal information relating to the 
representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization”). 
 93. SEC Final Rule, supra note 1, § 205.3(d)(2), quoted supra note 85. 
 94. The Gatekeeper Initiative is described in Sally Baghdasarian, Comment, 
Gatekeepers: How the Broad Application of Anti-Money Laundering Statutes and 
Strategies May Open An Attorney’s Gates to Prosecution, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 721, 725–
26 (2003); Kevin L. Shepherd, USA PATRIOT Act and the Gatekeeper Initiative: 
Surprising Implications for Transactional Lawyers, 16 PROB. & PROP. 26, 27 (2002); 
Zacharias, supra note 35; Bruce Zagaris, Gatekeepers Initiative: Seeking Middle Ground 
Between Client and Government, 16 CRIM. JUST. 26, 30 (2002). 
 95. ABA Delegates Vote Opposition to Proposals to Make Attorneys Report Shady 
Transactions, 19 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT 99 (2003). 
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What is interesting about the ABA Task Force’s noble sentiments is 
that they have been expressed before any proposal actually has issued. 
One can imagine possible proposals that would undermine the role of 
lawyers—such as a rule requiring lawyers to investigate clients and 
report any suspicious activity to law enforcement authorities, including 
suspicions about past wrongdoing.96  In contrast, if all that the reforms 
ultimately require is for lawyers to avoid aiding and abetting client 
crimes, this conduct already is required.97  The intermediate 
possibility—that lawyers may be asked to report future crimes—easily 
would fit within the traditional conception of the lawyer’s role,98 but 
(like all confidentiality exceptions) should be subjected to a policy 
analysis of its countervailing benefits for society and its costs to clients 
and the efficiency of the adversary system.  None of the possible 
formulations are vulnerable to the criticism that the proposed reforms are 
per se invalid because they turn lawyers into gatekeepers. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
At root, it is a good thing for lawyers to screen client misconduct.  It 
keeps lawyers themselves honest.  It serves societal interests in preventing 
harm.  It enhances judicial administration.  And it makes lawyers think 
about the morality and legality of clients’ conduct as well as their own, 
thus encouraging lawyers to help clients recognize and pursue 
appropriate behavior.  All of these are valid functions for lawyers, and 
they have always been understood to play a part in the lawyer’s 
everyday dealings with clients.  The recent reform proposals simply 
address some regulators’ perceptions that lawyers’ own understanding 
and implementation of these functions has not been adequate in recent 
times. 
But gatekeeping is only one part, and a relatively small part, of the 
lawyer’s role.  If lawyers are to put the adversary system into effect—with 
 
 96. Some observers, based in part on the reactions of other countries to the 
Gatekeeper Initiative, have assumed that the forthcoming proposals for U.S. lawyers 
might well include a requirement that lawyers inquire into or report suspicious 
transactions by their clients or both.  E.g., Baghdasarian, supra note 94, at 726; Susan R. 
Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality . . . And Its Exceptions . . ., 81 NEB. 
L. REV. 1320, 1348–49 (2003); Zagaris, supra note 94, at 28; ABA Creates Task Force 
on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, 17 CRIM. JUST. 31 (2002); cf. Nicole M. 
Healy, The Impact of September 11th on Anti-money Laundering Efforts, and the 
European Union and Commonwealth Gatekeeper Initiatives, 36 INT’L LAW. 733, 735 
(2002) (“The effects of [European] directives on U.S. lawyers practicing or doing 
business in EU or Commonwealth nations will bear watching, because these gatekeeper 
initiatives may conflict with U.S. lawyers’ ethical obligations of confidentiality.”). 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 51. 
 98. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
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all its societal benefits—society must protect lawyers’ ability to obtain 
information, ally themselves with lawful client ends, and serve even 
unpopular client causes.  Indeed, lawyers’ ability to act as gatekeepers, 
in some respects, depends on their partisanship.99 
The key to evaluating reform proposals that emphasize gatekeeping is 
to avoid rhetoric that ignores both aspects of the balance.  Characterizing 
any shift as an end to lawyering as we know it only serves to strengthen 
the case for reform.  That characterization suggests that its proponents 
misunderstand the limits of partisanship and themselves require reforms 
that will reeducate them about those limits.100 
Elihu Root was an aggressive, ultrapartisan lawyer.101  Yet he warned 
us that the lawyer’s job consists as much of standing in the way of 
misguided client pursuits as of implementing client desires.  No one 
except misguided practitioners and cynical criminal clients truly 
envision the lawyer’s role as assisting wrongful ends.  We are 








 99. This is one of the standard justifications for strict attorney-client 
confidentiality.  Arguably, only if the client understands that the lawyer is a complete 
ally and will not disclose confidences will the client inform the lawyer of intended 
misconduct and thereby provide an opportunity for the lawyer to dissuade the client.  See 
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 359 (1989) 
(reviewing the justifications for strict confidentiality); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1307 (2003) 
(justifying a gatekeeper role for lawyers, in part, on the basis that “the ultimate goal of 
the law is to achieve law compliance, not to maximize uninhibited communications 
between the attorney and client.  Client confidentiality is a means to an end, not an end 
in itself.  Thus, the law has long placed some limitations on attorney-client 
communications . . . .”). 
 100. An interesting example of this phenomenon is discussed in Baghdasarian, 
supra note 94, at 731, which suggests that one of the two reasons not to emphasize 
lawyer gatekeeping is the mere fact that such an emphasis might lead to the government 
pursuing “criminal sanctions against an attorney.”  Of course, there is nothing inherent in 
the lawyer’s role that should immunize lawyers from prosecution for aiding and abetting 
client crimes.  See authorities cited supra notes 48 and 51. 
 101. See LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 18 (“[W]hile he would not prostitute himself to 
abet illegal action, he did believe he should help businessmen operate to the fullest 
advantage within the letter of the law.”). 
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